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Abstract 
This paper presents a case study application of a new methodological framework for undertaking 
distributional cost-effectiveness analysis (DCEA) to combine the objectives of maximising health and 
minimising unfair variation in health when evaluating population health interventions.  The NHS Bowel 
Cancer Screening Programme (BCSP) introduced in 2006 is expected to improve population health on 
average but also to worsen population health inequalities associated with deprivation and ethnicity  ? 
a clasƐŝĐ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ  “ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?.  We demonstrate the DCEA framework by 
examining two redesign options for the BCSP: (1) the introduction of an enhanced targeted reminder 
aimed at increasing screening uptake in deprived and ethnically diverse neighbourhoods and (2) the 
introduction of a basic universal reminder aimed at increasing screening uptake across the whole 
population.  Our analysis indicates that the universal reminder is the strategy that maximises 
population health while the targeted reminder is the screening strategy that minimises unfair variation 
in health.  The framework is used to demonstrate how these two objectives can be traded off against 
each other, and how alternative social value judgements influence the assessment of which strategy is 
best, including judgements about which dimensions of health variation are considered unfair and 
judgements about societal levels of inequality aversion. 
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1. Introduction 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is used to support health sector decisions about the allocation of limited 
resources with the objective of maximising health (Drummond et al. 2005).  When dealing with 
population health interventions we often ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨŵŝŶŝŵŝƐŝŶŐ “ƵŶĨĂŝƌ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ
inequality (Cookson et al. 2009) and to this end are also interested in the social distribution of both 
health gains and health opportunity costs due to the intervention.  In this paper we propose a 
methodology for quantifying and combining these two objectives within an economic evaluation 
framework that highlights the social value judgements underpinning any particular conclusion.  This  
 “distributional cost-effectiveness ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?(DCEA) is demonstrated through a case study comparing 
potential redesign options to increase uptake of the NHS Bowel Cancer Screening Programme (BCSP) 
in England.   
 
Colorectal cancer (CRC) is the third most common cancer in the UK with approximately 40,000 new 
cases diagnosed annually resulting in almost 16,000 CRC related deaths per year (ONS 2012).  
Research has shown that using screening to diagnose and treat CRC earlier can significantly reduce the 
number of CRC deaths (Hewitson et al. 2008).  The Department of Health launched the BCSP in 2006 
and currently offers biennial screening with gFOBT to persons aged 60-74 years.  Variable uptake of 
screening has been observed among the first 2.6 million invitees to the national BCSP, with overall 
uptake averaging only 54% ranging from 61% in the least deprived areas to 35% in the most deprived 
areas, and showing a similar gradient in terms of small area based ethnic diversity measures (Logan et 
al. 2012),(von Wagner et al. 2011).  Furthermore, for those individuals with positive screening results 
there is also evidence of inequality in the uptake of follow up colonoscopy (Morris et al. 2012).  It is 
reasonable to expect that these inequalities in the uptake of the screening programme will exacerbate 
the already unequal distribution of health in the population, with the screening programme 
disproportionately benefiting more advantaged groups (for whom uptake is highest)  ? a classic case of 
 “intervention generated inequality ? (Lorenc et al. 2012).    
 
Prior to the introduction of the BCSP a number of possible screening options were evaluated to help 
NHS decision makers determine whether a screening programme was worthwhile and if so the form 
that it should take.  To that end a model was developed to assess the total resource implications and 
health impacts of screening by simulating the natural history of colorectal cancer and the impact of 
screening on that natural history (Tappenden et al. 2007).  This model was later refined and updated 
to reflect data emerging from the BSCP (Whyte et al. 2012),(Whyte et al. 2011).  In this paper we build 
on the latest version of this economic evaluation model and use it to estimate the distribution of 
health associated with alternative screening strategies.  We then compare these health distributions 
using our DCEA framework to determine the strategy that best addresses the dual objectives of 
maximising health and minimising health inequality. 
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2. METHODS 
2.1. Cost effectiveness analysis 
While recognising that in reality there are an almost infinite number of screening strategies that could 
be designed, in order to demonstrate the framework we simplify the comparison by considering four 
mutually exclusive options in our analysis: 
 
1.  “EŽƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ? ? 
2.  “^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ?ĂƐŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ^W in 2006 
3.  “dĂƌŐĞƚĞĚ ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ? P ^ĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ƉůƵƐ Ă ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ůĞƚƚĞƌ  ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů 'W
signed letter and tailored information package) sent only to those living in the most 
income deprived 40% of small areas (IMD4 and IMD5) as well as to those living in areas 
with the highest proportion of inhabitants from the Indian subcontinent (IS5).  This 
targeted subgroup comprises of approximately half of the total population invited for 
screening.  The costs of this strategy per person targeted are estimated to be £7 resulting 
in an estimated increase in average uptake of gFOBT among the targeted population of 
12%. 
4.  “hŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ? P ^ĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ƉůƵƐ Ă ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ďĂƐŝĐƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ůĞƚƚĞƌ (sending a GP 
endorsed reminder letter to all eligible patients).  The costs of this strategy per person are 
estimated to be £3.50 resulting in an estimated increase in average uptake of gFOBT of 
6%. 
 
We characterise the alternative reminder strategies in such a way as to ensure that both have 
approximately equal additional intervention costs and equal impact on the total screening uptake, 
while having very different distributional impacts.  While these reminder strategies are somewhat 
stylised constructed to highlight the trade-offs between health improvement and health inequality,  
the potential costs and increases in uptake due to the strategies are estimates based on studies of 
similar interventions (Shankaran et al. 2007) (Hewitson et al. 2011). 
 
The economic evaluation model follows a cohort of one million 30 year olds through their lifetimes 
(allowing it to simulate the adenoma-carcinoma sequence) with screening invitations being sent out 
biennially to individuals between the ages of 60 and 74.  The model is run probabilistically to 
incorporate the uncertainty around the input parameters.   
 
2.2. Inequality analysis 
The cost-effectiveness analysis allows us to identify which of the strategies maximises total health.  In 
order to extend this analysis to allow us to evaluate our other key objective, that of minimising unfair 
health inequality, we require descriptions of the estimated distributions of health produced by the 
interventions being compared.  To produce these estimates we condition the model input parameters 
on factors associated with inequalities in health and inequalities in the effect of screening.  We then 
perform subgroup analyses according to these factors in order to estimate differential cost and health 
impacts.  The health impact per person within each subgroup is scaled by the size of the subgroup in 
order to describe the total population distribution of health.   
 
The distribution of changes in health attributed to an intervention are informed not only by the 
distribution of the health gains among recipients of the intervention, but also by the distribution of 
health opportunity costs among those who would have received the displaced activities that the 
money spent on this intervention would otherwise have been spent on.  These opportunity costs are 
unlikely to fall in proportion to the intervention costs or benefits for particular recipients, and those 
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who would otherwise have benefited from the displaced activities may also include non-recipients of 
the intervention. 
 
2.2.1 Estimating a baseline population health distribution 
We estimate baseline inequality in the population distribution of expected lifetime health by 
extending the economic model to incorporate differential all-cause mortality rates by level of 
socioeconomic deprivation in addition to age and gender.  As estimates are based on ONS longitudinal 
study data (ONS 2007) we map social class groupings to deprivation measures.  We additionally 
include the differences in morbidity by using health related quality of life data by age and gender 
based on UK norms for EQ-5D (Kind et al. 1999) and further adjust for deprivation using the 
differences between life-expectancy and disability free life expectancy as observed in the ONS general 
lifestyle survey (Smith et al. 2010).  Using this data in the model we estimate a baseline population 
health distribution in terms of quality adjusted life expectancy (QALE).   
 
2.2.2 Estimating the distribution of uptake of the BCSP 
Analysis of the pilot study of the BCSP suggests that screening uptake (the proportion of those invited 
to screening who participate) varies by area level deprivation, area level ethnic diversity and gender of 
the participants (Weller 2009).  Area level deprivation is based on quintile groups of the index of 
multiple deprivation (IMD) 2004, and ethnic diversity is derived from area based quintiles measuring 
the proportion of people originating from the Indian subcontinent (IS).  Significant differences in 
uptake are observed in the data between all IMD quintile groups and between the most ethnically 
diverse quintile group (IS5) and the four least ethnically diverse quintile groups (IS1-4).  Area level 
variables are based on data at lower super output area (LSOA) level; these are small areas containing 
approximately 1,500 individuals.  Multivariate analysis of the pilot study results provides the 
independent effect of each characteristic on uptake (Weller 2009), allowing us to calculate the 
average uptake of gFOBT and follow up colonoscopy for each of our twenty distinct subgroups, 
comprising of all possible combinations of the two genders, five deprivation levels and two ethnic 
diversity levels.  We are unable to estimate the proportion of the population in each of the twenty 
groups from this data as correlation between characteristics was not reported.  Therefore, for the 
base case analysis we simply assume independence in the distribution of the characteristics.  Data 
from the pilot are used to extrapolate to the population at large by further assuming that the 
population in the pilot study is representative of the population in general.   
 
2.2.3 Estimating the distribution of opportunity cost 
Additional costs of screening and related downstream diagnostic and treatment costs come out of a 
fixed health budget, and the health opportunity cost due to the disinvestment of these funds from 
other uses within the NHS is assumed to be one QALY per £20,000, in line with current practice in the 
NHS.  Owing to the absence of further information on how these opportunity costs are distributed, in 
the base case analysis we assume that they are distributed equally across all population subgroups.  
We then perform sensitivity analyses by exploring two extreme assumptions around the distribution 
of opportunity cost:  first, where the entire opportunity cost is borne by the healthiest of our 20 
subgroups (females living in the least deprived and ethnically diverse areas), and second, where the 
entire opportunity cost is borne by the least healthy of our 20 subgroups (males living in the most 
deprived and ethnically diverse areas). 
 
2.2.4 Assuming all other factors equally distributed 
We are able to estimate a modelled distribution of health net of opportunity costs by incorporating 
the three sets of adjustments to the model that we have described above, namely: (1) the distribution 
of factors impacting baseline health; (2) the distribution of factors impacting screening uptake; and (3) 
the distribution of opportunity cost.  In so doing, however, we assume that all other factors in the 
model remain constant between the different subgroups of interest, In particular, a key assumption is 
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that CRC incidence and severity levels are equal across the relevant subgroups. This assumption was 
made due to data limitations and is supported by limited evidence suggesting that variation  in CRC 
incidence by social class is small (National Cancer Intelligence Network 2004).
1
 
 
2.2.5 Measuring inequality in the resulting health distributions 
Inequality in health distributions can be quantified in a variety of ways, and we present a battery of 
measures in order to be able to inform different inequality concerns from different stakeholders.  We 
start with relative measures of inequality; those that measure the proportional changes in health 
across the distribution.  These range from simple measures focusing only on the extremes of the 
distribution, such as the relative gap index, to more sophisticated measures assessing the entire 
distribution and allowing for different levels of relative inequality aversion.  An example of the latter is 
the Atkinson index, shown below for a population of n individuals with  representing the health of 
individual i,  representing mean health iŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ɸ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ
relative inequality aversion (Atkinson 1970).   
 
 
 
We also look at absolute measures of inequality; those that measure the absolute changes in health 
across the distribution.  These also range from simple extreme group measures, such as the absolute 
gap index, to more sophisticated measures assessing the entire distribution and allowing for different 
levels of absolute inequality aversion.  An example of the latter is  the Kolm index shown below with ɲ
representing the level of constant absolute inequality aversion (Kolm 1976).   
 
 
 
2.3. Social welfare analysis 
Having separately quantified average population health and the level of health inequality resulting 
from each of our four screening strategies, we next combine concerns for maximising population 
health and concerns for minimising health inequality using social welfare analysis.  We first check for 
distributional dominance in a very general sense using the idea of generalised Lorenz dominance 
(Shorrocks 1983) to compare the estimated health distributions and eliminate dominated strategies.  
To compare the remaining, non-dominated strategies we turn to more restricted social welfare indices 
that explicitly trade off increases in the mean health against greater equality in the distribution of 
health (Wagstaff 2002) ?  dŚĞƐĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĐĂůŝďƌĂƚĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƐĐĂůĞ ďǇ ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŶ  “ĞƋƵĂůůǇ
ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚ ? ? ?ůĞǀĞůŽĨŚĞĂlth for the health distribution: the level of health each person 
in the population would receive in a hypothetically perfectly equal health distribution such that society 
would be indifferent between that equal distribution of health and the actual unequal distribution of 
health.  We focus on two such social welfare indices constructed by combining the mean level of 
health with the Atkinson and Kolm inequality indices respectively.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Note that the stage of detection will be on average later in those groups with lower uptake and so modelled cancer related 
mortality does differ between subgroups 
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In the case of no concern for inequality  ?ɲA?ɸA? ? ?the social welfare indices just collapse to the mean 
level of health.  The difference between mean health and EDE health for a given level of inequality 
aversion indicates the average decrement in health per person society is willing to sacrifice in order to 
achieve a perfectly equal distribution of health conditional on the level of inequality in the current 
health distribution.  Calculating and comparing the EDEs for the predicted health distributions allows 
us to rank these strategies over a range of possible inequality aversion levels. 
 
2.4. Adjustment for alternative social value judgements 
If our inequality concern does not apply to all sources of variation in health  ? for example, if some 
determinants of individual ill health are deemed to be a matter of unavoidable bad luck or individual 
responsibility  ? then further analysis is required in order to isolate just the variation in health deemed 
to be unfair.   
 
We can isolate this health distribution of interest by undertaking multivariate analysis on our raw 
health distribution, to control for  “fair ? variation in health in order to leave a distribution of health 
reflecting only the  “unfair ? variation.  The adjustment process we use here has been referred to as 
 “ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ƵŶĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ(Fleurbaey & Schokkaert 2009).  This  “fairness adjusted ? 
distribution of health is then evaluated in place of the unadjusted distribution, using the same 
inequality and social welfare index approaches.  Alternative judgements about which variation in 
health is considered fair or unfair can lead to different conclusions as to which intervention strategy is 
preferred, and so the sensitivity of the decision to alternative sets of reasonable social value 
judgements regarding fairness should be assessed.  In the current case study, the social variables of 
interest are gender, area based level of deprivation and area based ethnic diversity.  There are eight 
possible permutations of social value judgements we can make on whether or not each of these three 
ƐŽĐŝĂů ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ Ă  “ĨĂŝƌ ? Žƌ  “ƵŶĨĂŝƌ ? ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŽĨǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ranging from all three 
ďĞŝŶŐĚĞĞŵĞĚ “ƵŶĨĂŝƌ ?ƚŽĂůůƚŚƌĞĞďĞŝŶŐĚĞĞŵĞĚ “ĨĂŝƌ ? resulting in the trivial case where there is no 
variation in health in the adjusted distribution).  
  
For our base case analysis we characterise all variation in health as unfair.  We then check the 
sensitivity of the ranking of strategies to each of the other seven possible social value judgements that 
can be made in this example.  To apply these alternative social value judgements, we adjust our health 
distribution to only reflect  “unfair ? variation in health by using reference values for the  “ĨĂŝƌ ?variables 
while preserving the actual values for the  “ƵŶĨĂŝƌ ?variables.   
 
In cases where dominance rules, such as generalised Lorenz dominance, do not provide a complete 
ordering of strategies, additional social value judgements are required to assess trade-offs between 
improving total population health and reducing unfair health inequality.  The key additional social 
value judgements that need to be made relate to the choice of inequality measures underpinning 
social welfare and the level of inequality aversion.  We calculate our results for relative (Atkinson) and 
absolute (Kolm) inequality indices at both high and low levels of inequality aversion, and check the 
sensitivity of our decision across a range of inequality aversion levels in order to identify the 
thresholds at which each strategy would be preferred. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1. Cost effectiveness results 
Table I shows the population level cost-effectiveness results for the four different strategies.  The 
results are based on a lifetime model of a cohort of 1 million 30 year olds and net health benefits 
(NHB) are calculated at a cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000 per QALY.   
 
Table I. Standard cost-effectiveness results 
 Bowel Cancer 
Related Cost (£) Life Years QALYs 
Incremental Net Health 
Benefit  (QALYs)* 
1. No screening 278,793,874 50,577,384 41,762,818 - 
2. Standard screening 350,872,069 50,634,273 41,806,794 40,372 
3. Screening + targeted 
reminder 
400,936,962 50,639,192 41,810,506 41,581 
4. Screening + universal 
reminder 
385,268,692 50,639,452 41,810,784 42,642 
Results based on a lifetime model for a cohort comprising of one million 30 year olds 
* Incremental to No screening 
 
The screening programme in any form improves population health and has positive net health benefits 
as compared to no screening.  On the basis of these cost-effectiveness results, if the objective is solely 
to maximise population health, we should choose screening with the addition of the universal 
reminder. 
 
3.2. Inequality results 
The baseline distribution of health measured in QALE is shown in Figure 1.  We can see from this 
distribution that in the absence of any screening programme there are substantial inequalities in the 
population health distribution. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Baseline health distribution 
 
We next look at the impact of the three screening options on this baseline health distribution.  Figure 
2 shows the impact of each option in terms of screening uptake by baseline population health.  Figure 
3 shows how uptake translates into changes in the health distribution. 
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Figure 2: gFOBT uptake distribution 
 
It is evident from Figure 2 that there is a positive monotonic relationship between baseline health and 
gFOBT uptake, with uptake being higher for those who are already more healthy, regardless of the 
specific form of the screening programme under consideration.  The universal reminder results in a 
parallel shift in gFOBT uptake as compared to the standard screening programme, with uptake 
increasing by the same amount (6%) in each health quintile.  The targeted reminder flattens the 
uptake gradient between the health quintiles, resulting in a higher uptake in the lower health quintiles 
and a lower uptake in the higher health quintiles as compared to the universal reminder strategy.  
 
Figure 3a shows the changes to the population health distribution associated with each of our three 
screening strategies relative to no screening, and Figure 3b looks more closely at the impact of the two 
redesign strategies as compared to the standard screening programme. 
 
 Figure 3a: Health compared to no screening  (per 
million of population invited for screened) 
 Figure 3b: Health compared to standard screening 
(per million of population invited for screening) 
 
ŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚ “ŶŽƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?ƚhe screening programme in any of the three forms improves health 
across the distribution and widens health inequality in absolute terms, improving the health of the 
healthiest most and the least healthy least.  Looking to Figure 3b we see that compared to standard 
screening the universal reminder is health improving across the distribution and further exacerbates 
absolute health inequality.  By contrast, the targeted reminder as compared to standard screening 
reduces absolute health inequality by focussing additional benefits on the least healthy.  It also 
reduces the health of some of the more healthy groups who benefit very little from the targeted 
reminder but still bear the health losses due to the opportunity cost of the strategy. 
 
Combining the baseline health distribution and the estimated distribution of health changes 
associated with each of our screening strategies provides the overall health distribution associated 
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with each strategy.  Table II reports a range of absolute and relative inequality measures calculated for 
each strategy. 
 
Table II. Measures of inequality 
Relative Inequality Indices no screening standard targeted reminder universal reminder 
 Relative Gap Index (ratio)  0.17527* 0.17592 0.17586 0.17596 
 Relative Index of Inequality (RII)  0.18607* 0.18674 0.18668 0.18678 
 Gini Index  0.03101* 0.03112 0.03111 0.03113 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɸA? ? ? 0.00171* 0.00172 0.00172 0.00172 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɸA? ? ? 0.01330* 0.01337 0.01337 0.01338 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɸA? ? ? ? 0.06253* 0.06281 0.06279 0.06283 
 
Absolute Inequality Indices no screening standard targeted reminder universal reminder 
 Absolute Gap Index (range)  10.98604* 11.03064 11.02726 11.03325 
 Slope index of inequality (SII)  12.88747* 12.94123 12.93691 12.94438 
 <Žůŵ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0.20281* 0.20430 0.20416 0.20439 
 <Žůŵ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 0.87801* 0.88429 0.88371 0.88467 
 <Žůŵ/ŶĚĞǆ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 4.56391* 4.58739 4.58587 4.58883 
* indicates the most equal strategy 
ɸA? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐůŽǁƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞɸA? ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŚŝŐŚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ 
ɲA? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐůŽǁĂďƐŽůƵƚĞŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶǁŚŝůĞɲA? ? ?5 represents high absolute inequality aversion 
 
All relative and absolute inequality measures calculated across a range of inequality aversion levels 
rank no screening as the least unequal and the universal reminder as the most unequal of the four 
strategies. 
 
3.3. Social welfare results 
We next combine our concerns for maximising health and minimising health inequality using social 
welfare analysis.  We find that the estimated health distributions associated with both no screening 
and standard screening are generalised Lorenz dominated by those associated targeted and universal 
reminder strategies.  This implies that both reminder strategies deliver more population health on 
average and a fairer distribution of health than the dominated strategies.  Dominance does not apply 
between the targeted and universal reminder strategies, however, so we turn to our social welfare 
indices evaluated across a range of inequality aversion levels.  The values of these indices are reported 
in Table III. 
 
Table III. Measures of social welfare 
Social Welfare Indices targeted reminder universal reminder 
 DĞĂŶ,ĞĂůƚŚ ?ɸA䄀 ɲA? ? ? 69.30127 69.30233* 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ɸA䄃? ? 69.18238 69.18331* 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ɸA䄃? ? 68.37503 68.37510* 
 ƚŬŝŶƐŽŶ ?ɸA䄃? ? ? 64.94991* 64.94796 
 <Žůŵ ?ɲA?0.025)  69.09711 69.09794* 
 <Žůŵ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 68.41756 68.41767* 
 <Žůŵ ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 64.71541* 64.71350 
* indicates the strategy yielding the highest social welfare 
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The social welfare indices show that where there is little or no concern for inequality the universal 
reminder is the preferred strategy.  However, as inequality aversion increases the targeted reminder 
becomes the preferred strategy.  
 
The results thus far have assumed an equal distribution of opportunity cost. Table IV reports the 
sensitivity of these results to alternative extreme assumptions.  When all opportunity costs are borne 
by the least healthy subgroup, no screening and standard screening are no longer dominated.  
 
Table IV. Sensitivity to opportunity cost distribution 
 
All opportunity cost borne by 
least healthy subgroup 
 All opportunity cost borne by 
healthiest subgroup 
Social Welfare 
Indices 
no 
screening 
standard 
targeted 
reminder 
universal 
reminder 
 targeted 
reminder 
universal 
reminder 
 Mean Health  69.25969 69.30006 69.30127 69.30233*  69.30127 69.30233* 
 Atkinson EDE 
 ?ɸA? ? ? 69.14152 69.18056 69.18147 69.18252*  69.18286 69.18373* 
 Atkinson EDE 
 ?ɸA? ? ? 68.33888 68.36800* 68.36610 68.36734  68.37799* 68.37769 
 Atkinson EDE 
 ?ɸA? ? ? ? 64.92865* 64.91468 64.89302 64.89892  64.95627* 64.95350 
 Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? ?)  69.05688 69.09486 69.09556 69.09660*  69.09793 69.09866* 
 Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 68.38168 68.41112* 68.40958 68.41074  68.42046* 68.42020 
 Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲA? ? ? ? ? 64.69578* 64.68086 64.65951 64.66532  64.72148* 64.71879 
* indicates the strategy yielding the highest social welfare 
 
While the distribution of opportunity cost does not impact mean health it does impact the distribution 
of health and this is reflected in the social welfare measures.  This is particularly evident at 
intermediate levels of inequality ĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ  ?ɸA? ?ŽƌɲA? ? ? ? ?where we see that the preferred screening 
strategy changes from standard screening when all the opportunity cost is borne by the least healthy 
group, to universal reminder when opportunity cost is equally distributed, to targeted reminder where 
all the opportunity cost is borne by the healthiest group. 
 
3.4. Adjustment for alternative social value judgements results 
Our results so far have assumed all inequality is unfair, Table V reports the sensitivity of our results to 
all eight possible sets of social value judgements regarding which inequalities are deemed unfair that 
can be made in this example. 
 
Table V. Sensitivity of preferred screening strategy decision to the choice of social value judgements 
Social Value Judgment Preferred Strategy based on Social Welfare Index 
IMD 
Ethnic 
Diversity Gender 
Atkinson 
 ?ɸс ? ? 
Atkinson 
 ?ɸс ? ? 
Atkinson 
EDE 
 ?ɸс ? ? ? 
Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲс ? ? ? ? ? ?
Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲс ? ? ? ? 
Kolm EDE 
 ?ɲс ? ? ? ? 
Fair Fair Fair U U U U U U 
Fair Unfair Fair U U U U U U 
Fair Fair Unfair U U U U U U 
Fair Unfair Unfair U U U U U U 
Unfair Fair Fair U U T U U T 
Unfair Unfair Fair U U T U U T 
Unfair Fair Unfair U U T U U T 
Unfair Unfair Unfair U U T U U T 
U = universal reminder, T = targeted reminder 
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The sensitivity analysis suggests that in this example value judgements around the fairness of variation 
associated with area level deprivation are pivotal in determining the preferred strategy. 
 
Finally we explore the sensitivity of our social welfare indices calculated for the non-dominated 
strategies to the choice of inequality aversion level as shown in Figures 4a and 4b.  These figures show 
the difference between the EDE of the alternative strategies.  The threshold level of inequality 
aversion at which the targeted reminder becomes the preferred strategy is 8 for the Atkinson EDE and 
0.12 for the Kolm EDE.  At these levels of inequality aversion a decision maker would be willing to 
sacrifice 1000 potential QALYs among the population of 1 million 30 year olds in order to achieve the 
more equal distribution of health offered by the targeted screening strategy. 
 
 Figure 4a: Sensitivity to level of relative inequality 
aversion 
 Figure 4b: Sensitivity to level of absolute inequality 
aversion 
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4. DISCUSSION 
4.1. Distributional cost-effectiveness analysis 
The results from the model show that while the national bowel cancer screening programme has a 
small per person benefit, this benefit is substantial at a population level.  This is to be expected for a 
population health intervention such as this, where the majority of people screened will not have 
bowel cancer and some of the people who develop bowel cancer may not participate in screening.  So 
despite large individual benefits accruing to people who participate in screening and have their bowel 
cancer detected early, these benefits accrue to only a relatively small number of people and are 
averaged across the whole population, giving a small expected per person benefit among the general 
population. 
 
Targeted and universal reminder strategies to increase uptake of bowel cancer screening both appear 
to be worthwhile in terms of improving population health.  In the base case analysis, both would be 
viewed as welfare increasing compared to no screening or standard screening for a broad range of 
social welfare functions reflecting different views on health inequality.  The universal reminder 
resulted in a greater population health improvement than the targeted reminder, but was less 
attractive in terms of its impact on increasing health inequalities.  In our base case analysis, the 
universal reminder would be the preferred intervention at the lower end of the range of inequality 
aversion values considered, but the targeted reminder could become preferred at high levels of health 
inequality aversion.   
 
While all three configurations of the screening programme are health inequality increasing compared 
to no screening, augmenting the current screening programme with a targeted reminder reduces 
health inequality.  By contrast, augmenting the current screening programme with a universal 
reminder slightly increases health inequality as compared to the standard screening programme 
alone.  Some aspects of the  “intervention generated inequality ? due to the screening programme arise 
due to inequalities in uptake of gFOBT and follow up colonoscopy.  However, some of the health 
inequality impact arises through differing rates of morbidity and other cause mortality (not related to 
bowel cancer directly).  Since we are interested in lifetime health, as measured here using QALE, 
detecting cancer earlier and thereby preventing a cancer-related fatality will inevitably deliver a larger 
health gain in social groups with relatively high QALE  (Hauck et al. 2002).  
 
4.2. Sensitivity analyses 
No screening and standard screening could be ruled out on the basis of generalised Lorenz dominance, 
but this was sensitive to an assumption about the distribution of the opportunity cost. The ranking 
produced by social welfare indices was sensitive to the type and level of inequality aversion. 
Furthermore, alternative social value judgements about the fairness of variation associated with the 
different population characteristics impact our choice of preferred strategy.     
 
4.3. Conclusion 
The DCEA framework outlined in this paper demonstrates how concerns for unfair health inequality 
can be taken into account when evaluating health care interventions funded within a fixed health 
budget.  Transparency about value judgements and sensitivity analysis to reflect alternative value 
judgements is a key feature of the proposed framework.  This form of analysis is particularly relevant 
when considering redesign options for preventive health care programmes to ameliorate 
 “intervention generated inequalities ?, as in the case of the NHS BCSP.  Data requirements for such 
analyses are non-trivial.  However, credible DCEAs are currently feasible in at least some real world 
settings and further analyses will become possible in future as more evidence on distributional 
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐƐƚĂƌƚƐƚŽĞŵĞƌŐĞŝŶƚŚĞĞƌĂŽĨ “ďŝŐĚĂƚĂ ? ? More empirical work is required to determine a 
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realistic distribution of opportunity costs (plausibly reflecting the impact of likely disinvestment 
decisions in the health service) and to elicit reasonable ranges of values for societal levels of absolute 
and relative inequality aversion as well as social value judgements on what should be deemed as fair 
and unfair variations in health. 
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